
## TACTICS OF BERLIN AT THE SUPPLY


- 1. In the light of our estimate of Seviet intentions (Section 7, above), the testical aspect of the Summit conference relating to Berlin assumes everyiding importance. In view of the compressed nature which discussions at the Summit will inevitably assume, the Vestern testic should preferably be uncomplicated and direct so that it can be executed successfully in full. It should, moreover, as far as possible be flexible mough to cope with Seviet testics both astisipated and unanticipated. We see a range of testical possibilities theoretically available to the Vest:
- 2. The Western Powers could go to the Summit with a fixed position on Berlin which they are reasonably certain in advance will not be negotiable but beyond which they would not be prepared to go even presedurally to obtain agreement to discuss the subject further. They would, therefore, have to be prepared for a complete breakdown of discussions, and the Western testical objective at the Summit would thus essentially become one of attempting to have such a breakdown of negotiations occur under circumstances leaving the West in the best possible public posture.
- 3. A second possible testical approach is to all directly during the Sumit meeting at the achievement of a substantive agreement on Berlin of an interim nature acceptable to the West. In view of the time faster, this would proximally accordinate's quick initiation of substantive discussions, perhaps at a point country short of the July 25 proposals with the idea of rapidly noving towards an agreement of which they might provide the cure.

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- A. In the light of our estimate of Soviet intentions, however, neither of the foregoing is consistent with Western interests. A more realistic objective of the Western Powers at the Summit will be to gain time by providing sufficient inducement, as well as deterrent, so that the Soviets will not take action which fundamentally affects the Western position in Berlin. The West will accordingly wish to have a flexible approach in order to take advantage of any tactical possibilities which might develop. To achieve such an objective would presumably require at a minimum that a forum be provided after the Summit meeting for continuing discussion of the Berlin question. Western tactics should be designed to test what would additionally be required within the limits of the maximum acceptable so to achieve the desired results without conceding many anything unnecessarily.
- 5. The testical approach of the West might accordingly proceed as follows:
- a. On the assumption that the Seviets start out by insisting on the mesoscity of a peace treaty with the two Germanies, the Western Pewers would resubsit their Western Peace Plan. When the Seviets reject this, as may be anticipated, the Western Powers would advance their proposal for a plobiseits to be held in West and East Germany and in all Burlin. (See Section 3 shows.)
- b. When the discussion turns to Berlin proper, the Soviets vill presumbly reiterate the desirability of their free city proposal. The Vestern Powers would marmally wish to start by restating their standard position





position that the only lasting and real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the framework of German resultication,

- c. The next question would be whether there were any tactical advantages to be gained by the West in putting forward an all-Berlin preposal, even if such a proposal is considered non-negotiable?

  Question: Should this possibility be explored further?
- d. The Vestern Powers would thereafter be confronted with the choice either of attempting immediately to find some basis upon which Seviet acceptance of the idea of continuing negotiation of the Berlin problem could be obtained, or of attempting further to probe by making certain limited proposals dealing, for example, with the access question alone. Thus, the West might put forward the German proposal for a formal agreement embedying access improvements, or propose the establishment of a special Four-Power authority with German advisors to regulate and maintain access to Berlin. Whether such proposals would actually serve any purpose, tactical or otherwise, could only be judged in the light of the actual aituation at the time. Question: Should specific proposals along these lines be prepared by the Working Group?
- e. It might be possible to seeme an agreement perhaps no more than a tenit one to preserve the existing situation for a period of time during which an attempt might be made to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. One way of doing this might be to seek agreement at the Sunnit on certain general principles relating to Series which might be embedded in a directive and remand the tank of further negotiation to a subordinate group (perhaps Deputy Foreign Ministers), which would report

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back after an agreed period of time (purhaps 16 months) to the Heads of Governmente. To supplement this essentially procedural device, it might be desirable to attempt to refrae tension during this period of prolonged negotiation through certain reciprocal declarations which might possibly be made at the Sum it, e.g., to maintain unbindered communication to Junit.

Berlin and to avoid inflammatory propagands.

- f. It might, however, become elear that the Soviets could not be deterred from taking unilateral action affecting Berlin by such a limited action to remove the issue from the immediately critical category. The Vestern Powers might them be faced by the necessity to discuss more of the content of the interim arrangements on Berlin which would exist during the period of prolonged discussion. The theory of the July 28 proposals made by the West at Geneva was that discussions would resume only at the end of the stipulated time period of 5 years. An arrangement involving immediate discussions and reporting back to Needs of G vernments after a shorter time should presumably be simpler and less definitive in its treatment of the issues between the Soviets and the West. This might include certain of the July 28 proposals or perhaps be more along the lines of Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report.
- g. At some point the Western Powers would, therefore, have to decide, in the light of the existing situation, whether they should reintroduce some version of their July 25 proposals on Berlin, or a proposal along the lines of the London Working Group Solution C of April 1959 (interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access, propaganda, etc.)

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with a view to referral of the details to a committee of experts for further negotiation. This would presumably give the Soviets plansible grounds for agreeing to this course, if they were willing to postpone a shouldown on Berlin.

- 6. If the Soviets refuse this, we could then inform them that the negotiations on Berlin appeared to be getting nowhere and that we feel the whole question should be referred to a committee of experts who would report to a subsequent Summit meeting. (The committee of experts might well be at the Deputy Foreign Ministers' level, if added stature for the negotiating body would assist in reaching agreement.)
- 7. One tastical question which will arise is whether, and if so at what point, the West should express willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany either in a Deputies or expert group. It seems possible to make this consession in method without any projedice to the basis Western position, of there is a tastical advantage to be gained. An important consideration would be whether it appears at some point during the Summit conference that a Vestern offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of achieving the Western objective of continuing conversations with the Soviets.
- 8. The Working Group assumes, of course, that the general mood of the Summit will to some extent be influenced by the amount of agreement already reached or in prospect in the disarmament field. If the situation in this field is favorable, it would give the Western Powers a certain leverage to use in persuading the Soviets not to press too hard on the

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Berlin issue. However, the precise testical interrelationship of the various subjects at the Summit can only be determined later in the light of the actual situation.

- 9. Should it become evident that the Soviets vill refuse to agree to further discussion of the Berlin question except on the basis of non-acceptable con essions by the West, the Western Powers might consider setting into notion a Berlin plobiseite in the Western sectors of the city in order to provide the best starting point for ensuing developments.
- 10. If it some that an impasse has been reached and the best judgment is that a real danger exists the Soviets vill proceed to take unillateral action preparatory to ending their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might econolude that the time had come to put the Soviets on notice and perhaps also to initiate UK action as contemplated in their contingency plans.
- 11. The possibility exists (as suggested by imbassador Smirnov in Bonn) that the Soviets will at an early stage attempt to resume the discussion of an interim solution for Berlin at the point where the General discussion broke off, stating that, while the Western proposals of July 28 were not entirely satisfactory, they are villing to consider whether certain further changes could not be made which might make possible an agreement. Should this take place, the Western Powers will have to take eare that they are not menouvered into the embarraseing position of refusing to talk about their own proposals. One possibility aimed at avoiding immediate negotiation on this basis would be for the Western

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Powers to emphasize that the only real and it ming solution to the Berlin problem is within the framework of Gerran remulfication which the Western Peace Plan was intended to achieve in a reasonable and fair way. The Western Powers could then move back to their July 28 proposals via the course suggested in paragraph 5.d., showe, plus any other tentical proposals sixed at improving various aspents of the Western position in Berlin.

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